Detecting and Characterizing Extremist Reviewer Groups in Online Product
  Reviews by Gupta, Viresh et al.
1Detecting and Characterizing Extremist Reviewer
Groups in Online Product Reviews
Viresh Gupta, Aayush Aggarwal, Tanmoy Chakraborty
Dept. of Computer Science & Engg., IIIT-Delhi, India
{viresh16118, aayush16002, tanmoy}@iiitd.ac.in
Abstract—Online marketplaces often witness opinion spam in
the form of reviews. People are often hired to target specific
brands for promoting or impeding them by writing highly
positive or negative reviews. This often is done collectively in
groups. Although some previous studies attempted to identify
and analyze such opinion spam groups, little has been explored
to spot those groups who target a brand as a whole, instead of
just products.
In this paper, we collected reviews from the Amazon product
review site and manually labelled a set of 923 candidate reviewer
groups. The groups are extracted using frequent itemset mining
over brand similarities such that users are clustered together if
they have mutually reviewed (products of) a lot of brands. We
hypothesize that the nature of the reviewer groups is dependent
on 8 features specific to a (group,brand) pair. We develop a
feature-based supervised model to classify candidate groups
as extremist entities. We run multiple classifiers for the task
of classifying a group based on the reviews written by the
users of that group, to determine if the group shows signs of
extremity. A 3-layer Perceptron based classifier turns out to be
the best classifier. We further study behaviours of such groups
in detail to understand the dynamics of brand-level opinion
fraud better. These behaviours include consistency in ratings,
review sentiment, verified purchase, review dates and helpful
votes received on reviews. Surprisingly, we observe that there
are a lot of verified reviewers showing extreme sentiment, which
on further investigation leads to ways to circumvent existing
mechanisms in place to prevent unofficial incentives on Amazon.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s world dominated by online marketplaces, review
portals and websites play a crucial role in the buyer’s decision
for their next purchase.
“Its a virtuous cycle – the more reviews, the more buys. The
more buys, the more reviews. The more buys, the higher your
rank in search and the more sales you get,” says Alice [1],
the owner of online cosmetic brand Elizabeth Mott.
Undoubtedly, it is highly likely that some people write
reviews which are less than truthful to manipulate widespread
decision of buyers in their favour. These people act either
individually or in groups. While individual reviewers write
such reviews in a matter of frustration or joy, they don’t
influence the overall opinion on a product to a large extent,
but help other buyers by stating their experiences. However,
a more compelling case is when multiple individuals form
an intricate web, and due to sheer higher number of people
reviewing (and certain other techniques, discussed in Section
VIII), they end up being a major influence on the overall
sentiment of the product. The extent of such influence is not
just limited to the reviews by opinion spam. Previous work
[2] has shown that 10-15% reviews are essentially echoing
the earliest reviews and thus a misleading early review has an
even higher influential potential.
This is wide-spread opinion spam, and every review website
must be aware of this activity and take appropriate measures
for identification and/or prevention of this phenomenon. This
is a classic example of collective fraud behaviour, where
several users are part of a business network and work together
to target and influence a particular product. This is a lesser-
known phenomenon, and most groups work following certain
techniques to not make their collaboration obvious. However,
since such groups are economically or otherwise incentivised,
and several of these are generally run by a given organization,
they have several targets for opinion spam which often share
certain common characteristics in their nature of reviews.
These characteristics can be exploited to classify them better
using a robust and thorough analysis technique. Amazon India,
to prevent opinion spam, has brought about a new policy which
limits the number of reviews on a product in a day, as stated
in [3].
In order to still be effective, we claim that certain groups
target brands in general, and post extreme reviews across
multiple products for a given target brand. This is a higher
level of opinion spamming, deliberately writing highly pos-
itive or negative reviews for a brand in general in order
to promote or demote them in the cut-throat competition
of the online marketplace. Studies have been conducted to
identify such groups which try to influence a product [4],
[5], [6]; however, groups exhibiting a brand-based opinion
spamming is a phenomenon that remains widely unexplored. A
detailed discussion is required for these brand-related activities
because these practices are against the code of conduct of these
review websites, since they negatively skew the brand-based
competition, giving innate (dis)advantages to certain brands.
Since only the non-verified reviews are limited by the
policies1, reviewers from these groups can often purchase
the product via Amazon in exchange for unofficial discounts
(e.g., cash backs) and post verified reviews since they did not
receive a discount via amazon’s mechanisms (e.g., coupons)
(see further discussed in Section VIII).
Figure 1 shows an example of such extremist groups (taken
from our annotated dataset as mentioned in Section III).
Four rows correspond to products belonging to four different
1https://www.amazon.in/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201930110
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Fig. 1: A sample extremist group. The reviews are all positive for different brands and also have a verified purchase sign with
all of them done on nearly the same dates. For example, in the first row, all reviewers have reviewed the product on the same
date, and have given a five-star rating with the review text having extremely similar content.
brands. Four columns represent four different reviewers who,
according to our annotation, are part of the same group. Each
box represents the review information. This is an example
of reviewers showing extreme likeliness towards these prod-
ucts/brands as can be seen from the extreme ratings, similar
comments and almost same date [7]. It is clear that this
group of reviewers had extreme sentiments towards the brands
reviewed, both in terms of the ratings and the review content.
While this has a large overlap with the classic collusion in
which reviewers target a product to bring up its ratings, this
kind of extremism in reviews is not in order to promote/demote
the ranking of a product, but rather to influence the perception
of people for a brand.
It is worth noting that such a kind of characterization
is different from just combining the groups of people who
provide extreme reviews on a product, because while the
groups focusing on a product may be extreme in their opinion,
they don’t necessarily intend to influence the brand image.
This, coupled with the fact that the same product may be sold
by different sellers, reduces the chance that a product level
opinion spamming reviewer group would target products of
the same brand. Sellers may not have any inclination towards
promoting any particular brand’s products; rather, they would
prefer to gain a better revenue on all products (may belong to
different brands) by their promotional campaigns. Hence such
a group is more likely to have a very narrow and specialised
source, e.g., the competing brands or the manufacturing brand
itself.
In this paper, we identify and study the behavioural char-
acteristics of extremist reviewer groups. We also build a
feature-based classifier based on the brand-specific activities
of reviewer groups to identify extremist groups on the Amazon
India marketplace. We then further analyze our methodology
to unfold behaviours which best signify such activities, and
compare and analyze the overall trend of these groups viz-a-
viz their behaviours.
The major contributions of this paper are fourfold:
• A manually labelled dataset of 923 reviewer groups which
are classified into ‘extremist’ and ‘moderate’ categories.
• The first-ever characterization and study of the novel
problem of identifying brand-level extremism.
• Detailed characterization of extremist reviewer groups.
• Design supervised approach to detect extremist reviewer
groups.
To encourage reproducible research, we have made
the codes publicly available at https://github.com/virresh/
extremist-reviewers.2
The paper is organized as follows: We briefly survey the
various studying related to review extremism, applications
developed using reviews and fake review detection in Section
II. Section III outlines the details of collected dataset and
annotation methodology. Section IV presents the modeling
of features at brand level and features that relate to brand
level extremism in groups along with the experimental setup.
Section V briefly discusses the results obtained by various
classifiers. Sections VI and VII characterize extremist users
based on the features and expert annotation. Section VIII
2We could not release the original Amazon Data due to the copyright issue.
Instead, we have released the scraper to collect the data. We have also released
the annotated data and feature values of individual groups.
3discusses the implications of the study. Finally, we conclude
in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We divide the existing literature into two parts: general
studies on e-commerce services and detection of fake reviews.
A. General Studies on E-commerce Reviews
There have been extensive studies on mining online reviews
and classifying them based on user sentiment [8], [9], [10],
[11]. Reviews have also been extensively used in developing
and augmenting recommendation systems [12], [13], [14], [15]
and extracting product features [16], [17], [18]. Another study
has also shown the utility of product reviews in explaining
the recommendations given by a recommendation system [19].
Pang et al. [20] showed the progression of reviews as an
important part of the decision-making process with the advent
of web 2.0 and studied them from retrieval perspective. Since it
is difficult for the buyer to wade through volumes of reviews,
researchers have conducted studies on summarizing reviews
based on user sentiment [21] and other features [22], [23],
[24] as well under the umbrella of opinion summarization.
All these studies indicated that product reviews are an
invaluable resource for determining the quality of a product.
Various marketing studies have also shown that reviews play
an important role in maintaining the online reputation of a
brand as well [25], [26].
A review usually consists of a star rating which helps to
influence a product’s overall ratings, but a review becomes
even more impactful when people read it. It has been found
that people read a review only when it is perceived as helpful
by them, which may be through various means – the helpful
upvotes by other consumers, the length of the review, star
ratings, readability, etc. [27], [28]. There have been several
efforts to understand what makes a review helpful to people
[27], [29], [30]. Based on these results, attempts have been
made to construct systems that can recommend reviews to
users [31] by predicting the perceived helpfulness of a review.
An important point to note is that all these studies emphasize
that review extremity is an important factor for assessing the
impact made by the reviews.
Extensive work has been done on assessing how review
extremity affects users [32], [33], [34] and the relation between
star ratings given by a reviewer and the reviewer’s attitude
[35]. A moderate review can arise out of indifference or
ambivalence [36], [37], and could prove to be useful for buyers
seeking in-depth knowledge [32], and an extreme review
provides quick validation for experience goods like movies,
books, etc. [33], [34]. It has been observed that moderate
reviews can affect “brand attitude” [27]. All the work indicates
extremity in reviews on a product level, which affects the brand
as a whole. We make an attempt to understand extremity in
reviews directly at the brand level and associate it with groups
involved in the same.
B. Studies on Fake Reviews
Since reviews are such an impactful resource, it is to be
expected that the review space is infested with malpractices as
well. There have been various efforts to uncover these practices
and understand them in-depth, broadly called as opinion spam.
These studies can be broadly classified into three categories:
1) Studies on Reviews: Jindal and Liu [38] made a pioneer-
ing effort to detect fake reviews. They introduced the problem
of opinion spam and analyzed online reviews in three varieties
- untruthful opinions, seller/brand only reviews (no product
involved) and non-reviews using near-duplicate content as
an indicator of fake reviews. Other studies dealing with the
detection of review-level spam explored linguistic features of
text [39], hand-made rules [40] and combination of review and
reviewer features [41]. A probabilistic framework for the same
has also been proposed in [42]. Ott et al. [39] synthesized fake
hotel reviews using Amazon Mechanical Turk, whereas Jindal
and Liu [38] worked on data scraped from Amazon and used
content duplicity as ground-truth. Both of them worked with
features at a review level. Jindal et al. [40] and Li et al. [41]
mentioned the role of brands briefly, but the main focus was
on fake reviews rather than extreme reviews.
2) Studies on Reviewers: Studies involved in detecting
reviewer fraud consider rating behaviour [43], trust scores
based on a relationship graph among reviewers, reviews and
stores [44]. Other studies [45], [46], [47] provided various
other methods exploiting behavioural footprints to identify
fraud reviewers such as bursts of popularity and use Bayesian
approaches. Notably, Wang et al. [44] introduced the usage of a
review graph for identifying such spammers. Mukherjee et al.
[45] tried to uncover features used by Yelp filters for abnormal
behaviours and revealed that reviewers involved in writing
fake reviews showed behavioural features and psychological
patterns of overuse of top common words. Mukherjee at al.
[46] and Fei et al. [47] employed strategies like Bayesian
modelling of spamicity as latent behaviour and Loopy Belief
propagation on modelled Markov Random Fields. However, in
all the approaches, the indicators for a fake reviewer, especially
when characterizing a reviewer by their rating behaviours
[43], highly positive or highly negative reviewers were more
often a suspect than a moderate rating. This may indicate that
extremism in reviews might also be related to opinion spam;
however, this front has not been explored yet.
3) Studies on Reviewer Groups: The effect of fraud re-
viewer groups is more detrimental and subtle than individual
fraud reviewers. The issue of manual labelling was addressed
by considering a group of reviewers instead of individual
reviews. Mukherjee et al. [4], [48] showed that labelling
a group of reviewers is considerably easier than labelling
individual reviews. Other interesting studies that leverage
metadata to characterize different entities in e-commerce sites
can be observed in [6], [5], where products, reviews and
users are classified simultaneously. Fei et al. [47] and Kakhki
et al. [49] showed that synchronicity is an important group
behaviour; Xu and Zhang [50] further used this signal as a
temporal indicator alongside combining several other measures
and proposed a completely unsupervised model for detecting
group collusion. Several graph-based approaches have also
4TABLE I: Description of the collected and annotated dataset.
Category # Reviews # Reviewers # Brands # Products
All 17,24,656 10,77,027 30,486 1,88,298
Filtered by
reviewer history 3,41,081 10,379 28,437 1,81,596
Annotated set 45,892 366 8,005 33,892
shown the potential to detect both spam reviewers and spam
reviews simultaneously [5]. Wang et al. [51] and Dhawan et al.
[7] extended the reviewer graph to detect collusive users, i.e.,
a temporary group of users that work in unison to spam. Again
there has been no study about any phenomenon of extremism
at a group level, especially with respect to a brand, since
extremism ultimately affects “brand attitudes”.
C. How Our Work is Different from Others?
Our work is different from the existing studies in the
following ways:
• We introduce the problem at a brand level which was not
considered in any of the previous studies.
• Unlike other studies which majorly focus on fake re-
view/reviewer detection, we here focus on extremist
reviewer detection, which may not be fake. Moreover,
we attempt to identify ‘groups’ instead of detecting
‘individual user’.
• We investigate the effect of Amazon’s 2016 changes in
reviewing policy and the review scenario post policy
changes.
III. DATASET
To the best of our knowledge, no dataset of consumer
reviews (on Amazon) that consists of brand information exists
so far. Thus, we attempted to create the first dataset of its kind
by crawling reviews from Amazon.in, the Indian counterpart
of the e-commerce giant. In this dataset, along with the regular
metadata, we also obtained the brand on which a review was
posted. Other metadata per-review include reviewer id, product
id (ASIN), brand, rating, review text, date, and the number of
helpful votes a review has received.
We also collected review history of users from their Amazon
profiles. Since scraping profile data is considerably slow (due
to bot authentications encountered by our scraper on the
customer’s Amazon profile) compared to product reviews, we
collected information for only those users who reviewed at
least two products of the same brand. This information would
allow us to study the characteristics of the individual reviewer
we get and form a characterisation of the reviewers belonging
to extreme categories.
The data was crawled during August - October 2018. The
dataset containing review history of reviewers consists of
341, 081 reviews from 103, 79 unique reviewers, spanning
across 181, 596 products from 28, 437 brands. Table I shows
the statistics of the complete dataset.
Since the dataset contains brand information associated with
each review, these reviews can be used to identify groups of
reviewers targeting a particular brand. This problem can be
seen as an extension of the existing data mining techniques
such as Frequent Itemset Mining (FIM) by considering itemset
as a sequence of reviewer IDs, where each transaction contains
the IDs of reviewers who have reviewed several products of
the same brand.
A. Preprocessing the Dataset
On Amazon, usually, a brand does not directly sell its
products. There are sellers that post their products and post
them up for sale. Thus, the scraped data with brand names
had an inherent issue. Different sellers might not give the exact
same brand name to products they list. Thus, identifying which
products belong to the same group needs some preprocessing
since the brand name may have subtle differences such as
different case (e.g., Whirlpool vs WhirlPool) or different
acronyms (e.g., LG vs L.G. Electronics).
Therefore, we used case-folding followed by careful stem-
ming to match products belonging to the same brand. Another
issue was anonymous reviews and deleted products. Since we
scraped reviews from user profiles, it is possible that some
products would have got deleted. In this case, we did not
have any brand information about this product, but the review
existed on the user’s profile. To deal with these cases, we
removed all reviews which did not have a brand associated
with them. Since every reviewer, including the anonymous
reviewers, is given a unique reviewer id, we did not remove
any anonymous reviews.
B. Detecting Candidate Groups
We use FIM based on the recursive elimination algorithm
[52] from SPMF library [53], for identifying candidate groups
keeping the minimum support count to 15. This would give us
a list of groups of reviewers, where all members of a resultant
group share at least 15 brands for which they have written at
least one review.
However, since members of a given group satisfy the
minimum support count criteria of 15, the members of all of
its sub-groups also satisfy the same criteria, the algorithm
also reports all the sub-groups for a given resultant group.
Therefore, for each group obtained, we prune our result to
drop all its sub-groups and keep only the maximal group.
Selection of minimum support count
Since (group, brand) pairs were to be labeled manually, we
wanted to have a decently diverse yet sufficiently large candi-
date group set. The total number of transactions for FIM to act
on (one transaction for every brand) was around 30.4k. The
minimum number of common brands (or minimum support
for frequent itemset mining) affects the size of candidate
groups drastically as shown in Figure 2 – one can notice that
beyond the 15 brand mark, the number of candidate groups
decreases rapidly. At 10 brands (≈ 0.03%), we have 5568
unique candidate groups, whereas at 20 brands (≈ 0.06%) we
have 2817 unique candidate groups. Note that these are unique
candidate groups; therefore, during labeling they would be
paired with each of the brands that the group has in common.
This in turn increases the amount of (group, brand) pairs
considerably. Thus, we choose 15 brands (≈ 0.05%) as the
minimum support count which results in 3746 unique groups.
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Fig. 2: Change in the number of unique groups with the
minimum support count. Beyond the 15 brand mark (i.e., ≈
0.05% of transactions) we can observe the rapid decrease in
unique potential candidate groups; whereas before this mark,
we have extremely large number of candidate groups.
C. Preliminary Observation
We perform an analysis of our data to understand the
relationships between brand and reviews. To this end, we
draw log-log plots of the number of reviews against brands,
products and reviewers (c.f. Figure 4). We observe a power-law
distribution for not only products and reviewers (as reported
in [38]), but also for brands (Figure 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c)).
This suggests the possibility that similar methods for detecting
extremism at brand level might work. Also, a distribution
of the ratings given to reviews is shown in Figure 4(d). We
observe that the number of reviews with a low rating (1- and
2-star) is comparatively less than that of high rating (4- and
5-star).
D. Human Annotation
The technique used in previous studies for labelling fake re-
views/reviewers was re-crawling to detect the deleted reviews
[54] and employing human judges for manual labelling [4],
[55], [43], [5], [39], [56].
Some crucial insights while manually annotating reviewer
groups are mentioned in [57], such as review length, similarity,
excessive use of capitalization, brand pin-pointing, personal
relationship with brands, etc. The labelling was done keeping
in mind these insights regarding the ratings, review title,
review text, date posted, the number of helpful votes received,
and also in some cases the product and reviewer ids. We
leverage this information to perform manual labelling. These
have been summarised in Table II.
Once the pruning is completed by recursive elimination
[52], we made (group,brand) tuples based on what brands
the group has reviewed. This gave us around 180,000 pairs.
Since there were too many candidate groups, our annotators
could only manage to label 923 candidate (group,brand) pairs
as either 0 or 1, based on if they are genuine/moderate or
extreme (brand critical or brand positive). 469 and 454 groups
were marked as extreme and moderate groups, respectively.
We employed three annotators who were within the age
TABLE II: Factors kept in mind by the annotators while
annotating the dataset.
Criterion Information focused on
Brand mentions Individual review
Excessive use of superlatives in text Individual review
Excessively positive or negative sentiment Individual review
Similarity in product description and review Individual review
Rating variety Reviewer profile
Number of reviews written Reviewer profile
Rating deviation from the average rating Reviewer profile
Reviewer’s active duration Reviewer profile
Similarity in reviews among group members Group
Time of reviews of group members Group
Rank of reviewers the group has Group
group of 20-35 years and were experts in e-commerce service
policies. Out of 1000 reviews labelled, there was disagreement
by the three annotators in around 77 groups. Therefore, we
considered only 923 groups which all the three annotators
agreed upon. The inter-annotator agreement is κ = 0.86
(Cohen’s κ). We then use this as a ground-truth to draw
insights about extremist user groups, train classifiers to detect
extremist groups, and identify the most important features that
such extremist groups exhibit.
One may argue that the annotated dataset is small in size.
We would like to emphasize that such annotation is extremely
challenging and time-consuming since the annotators need
to go through each group separately and analyze the review
patterns of all the constituent members of the group. In
our case, the entire annotation took two and a half months
to finish. As suggested by [58], We did not use Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) for this annotation task because
MTurk is normally used to perform simple tasks which require
human judgments. However, our task is highly challenging,
and the annotators required access to our data. Also, we needed
annotators who had proper domain knowledge on the product
review domain. Thus, we believe that MTurk was not suitable
in our case. Due to the same problem, Mukherjee et al. [58]
also did not use MTurk for the annotation of fake reviewer
groups.
E. Product-level vs. Brand-level Analysis
Since no work at product-level deals with extremism, we use
spamicity, an unsupervised metric computed by FraudEagle
[59], as a substitute to product-level extremism which helps us
to (i) compute scores for all reviewers, and (ii) circumvent the
problem of labels. Also in this experiment, we only consider
the (group, brand) pairs that are labelled as extremist. We
compute the spamicity of all reviewers in our database using
complete data and then consider the following distributions of
spamicity score:
1) Distribution of spamicity scores of all reviewers in a
(group, brand) pair,
2) Distribution of spamicity scores of all reviewers for the
corresponding brand.
Since the cardinality of the above two distributions might not
be same, we take the size of the smaller set (i.e., the number
of reviewers in (group, brand) pair) as the maximum rank till
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Fig. 3: (a) The estimated density of KL divergence in scores
between top brand spammers vs. reviewers in extremist (group,
brand) pairs for all extremist labeled pairs. The divergence in
the spamicity scores for extremist reviewers vs. top spammers
is high (peaking around 1.48). (b) The absolute values of these
spamicity scores of reviewers. Again the spamicity scores of
extremist reviewers (blue) is in extreme contrast with top brand
spammers (red), indicating that spamicity at product-level is
unable to map extremism at brand level.
which the divergence of the two distributions is computed.
Figure 3(a) shows the Gaussian kernel density estimate of
the KL-divergence scores between the two distributions for
all extremist (group, brand) pairs. The spamicity scores lie in
the range of 0-1, whereas the mean (± standard deviation) of
the density is 1.48(±0.83), which is quite high, indicating the
inherent difference in the two distributions. Figure 3(b) shows
the absolute spamicity scores plotted according to correspond-
ing ranks. All (group, brand) rankings were flattened out, thus
the highest spamicity score amongst all reviewers in (group,
brand) pair is compared to the highest spamicity score amongst
all reviewers for that brand; and the lowest spamicity score
amongst all reviewers in (group, brand) pair is plotted against
the same ranked score amongst all reviewers for that brand.
From both of these experiments, we conclude that there is a
significant difference amongst brand-level extremist reviewers
to product-level spammers (the spamicity scores do not reflect
brand-level extremism), reinforcing the utility of our study.
IV. CLASSIFICATION MODEL
We follow a feature-based classification technique to deter-
mine if a candidate group is an extremist group w.r.t to a given
brand. For classification, we use state-of-the-art classifiers
such as SVM, RandomForest, Logistic Regression, Decision
Tree, Gaussian Naive Bayes, K Nearest Neighbors (KNN),
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), 3-layer Perceptron (MLP)
and XGBoost. We additionally test with an additional layer
in the MLP based architecture which consists of two fully
connected hidden layers followed by a dense layer with a soft-
max activation as output layer, forming a 4-Layer Perceptron.
Note that this 4-Layer Perceptron is just to test the effect of
increased depth.
A. Features Used for Classification
Previous studies proposed useful features for detecting
group spam. For example, Mukherjee et al. [4] proposed eight
Fig. 4: Preliminary analysis. Variation of reviews with (a)
number of brands, (b) number of reviewers and (b) number
of products. We observe a power law distribution in all cases.
Fig. (d) shows the percentage of reviews having a given rating.
Also as a general trend, the number of 1- and 2-star reviews
is less than 4- or 5-star reviews.
features that are highly useful for detecting group spam. We
extend these features into brand-level and identify groups of
extremist users. The features we used are as follows:
1) Average Rating: It captures the average rating given
by the group G to a certain brand B. We aggregate
the reviews given by group members to products of the
given brand and take the mean of these ratings. We
hypothesize that an extreme group may give an average
rating value at the extremes, i.e., closer to 5-star or 1-
star.
avg rating(G,B) = avg
m∈G,p∈B
rating(m, p)
where rating(m, p) is the rating given by member m
to product p.
2) Average Upvotes: It captures how many upvotes the
given group receives with respect to the given brand.
This is the mean of upvotes taken across reviews posted
by the group members, for products belonging to the
given brand.
avg upvotes(G,B) = avg
m∈G,p∈B
upvote(m, p)
where upvote(m, p) is the number of upvotes of the
reviews for product p posted by reviewer m.
3) Average Sentiment: We analyze the review text for
the given (group,brand) pair, and find out the average
sentiment of these reviews. We use SentiWordNet 3.0
[60] for the sentiment analyser, which returns an overall
sentiment for the review text between -1 to 1. An extrem-
ist group may write reviews having an overall sentiment
of being highly positive (+1), or highly negative (-1)
towards a particular brand.
avg sentiment(G,B) = avg
m∈G,p∈B
sentiment(m, p)
7where sentiment(m, p) indicates the sentiment of the
review on product p posted by reviewer m.
4) Group Time Window (GT): It indicates the difference
between the latest review posted by the group and the
earliest review posted by the group for the given brand.
A lower value of GT may suggest that the group is
closely linked together and indulges in spamming the
reviews together.
GT (G,B) =
{
0 if L(G,B) − F (G,B) > τ
1 − L(G,B)−F (B,B)
τ
Otherwise
where L(G,B) and F (G,B) are the last and the first
dates of any review posted by any member of group G
on any product of brand B, respectively. Empirically,
τ = 0.28 was found to produce the best result.
5) Review Count: This feature captures how many reviews
are written by the group for the particular brand. An
extremist group is more likely to write more reviews
collectively than other users.
RC(G,B) =
∑
m∈G
|reviews(m,B)|
where |reviews(m,B)| is the number of reviews written
by reviewer m on all products belonging to brand B.
6) Rating Deviation: It captures how much does the
(group, brand) deviate from the mean rating. The re-
viewers of an extremist group are expected to possess
a lesser deviation since they must write highly coherent
opinions for the brand.
σ(G,B) =
|〈rG,B〉 − 〈r¯G,B〉|
4
where 〈rG,B〉 and 〈r¯G,B〉 represent the average rating
given by group G on products belonging to brand B, and
average rating given by anyone not belonging to group
B on products of brand B. The deviation is normalized
by 4 since the rating ranges from 1 to 5; the maximum
rating deviation can be 4.
7) Early Time Window (ET): It measures the time gap
since the product spawned on the marketplace, and the
last review posted on for it by the group. The mean value
is taken across all the products for the brand.
ET (G,B) = avg
p∈B
TW (G, p)
TW (G, p) =
{
0 if L(G, p)− α(p) > β
1− L(G,p)−α(p)
β
Otherwise
where L(G, p) is the latest review date for a review done
by any member of group G on a product p, and α(p)
is the earliest review date for product p. Empirically,
β = 0.28 was found to produce the best result.
8) Verified Purchase: A review where the product was
actually bought by the reviewer holds more credibility
than the opposing case. This feature determines the
fraction of reviews posted by the group for the brand
corresponding to amazon-verified-purchase reviews.
V P (G,B) =
|verified(G,B)|
RC(G,B)
where |verified(G,B)| is the number of verified re-
views done by any member in G for a product belonging
to brand B, and RC(G,B) is the review count as
mentioned earlier.
B. Experimental Setup
We utilize standard grid search for hyperparameter opti-
mization (as suggested in [61]). For better reproducibility, we
also report the parameters used for each classifier: MLP –
logistic function as activation function, learning rate of 1e-5,
2 hidden layers each with 100 neurons; KNN with K = 5;
CART with Gini gain criteria for Decision Tree and Random
Forest; for SGD learning rate of 1e-5, modified Huber as loss
function, maximum iteration of 200, and L2 norm as penalty
function, XGBoost with maximum tree depth of 4, learning
rate of 0.1 and total of 100 estimators. The results are reported
after 10-fold cross-validation with suitable hyper-parameter
optimization.
To report the accuracy of the classifiers, we use standard
evaluation metrics, i.e., precision, recall, F1-score and Area
under the ROC curve (ROC-AUC), with both micro and macro
averaging.
V. CLASSIFICATION RESULTS
Table III summarizes the classification accuracy. We observe
that all the methods performed decently in predicting the
label of the given candidate (group, brand) pair. However, the
performance of neural network-based methods (3 and 4 Layer
Perceptron) is superior compared to the rest of the classifiers.
This may be due to the data being accurately mapped by deep
learning methods. 3-Layer Perceptron seems to be the best
method with an accuracy of 0.98 across all the metrics used to
evaluate the performance. Decision Tree seems to be the worst
among all the classifiers since it is extremely sensitive to small
variations which are prevalent in our dataset. Nevertheless, we
conduct the rest of the experiment with 3-Layer Perceptron as
the default classifier.
VI. FEATURE IMPORTANCE
To estimate and interpret how much each feature is in-
dicative of extremist behaviour, i.e. how much a feature
governs the overall extremity of a group, we use the optimal
feature weight distribution of our Random Forest classifier
(Table V) as it’s an established fact that Random Forest is
a highly interpretable classifier. Alternatively, we run our 3-
Layer Perceptron, omitting each feature in isolation, and note
down the drop in classification accuracy, which should also tell
us how important each feature is to determine the extremity
of a group. The observations are shown in Table IV.
The review count, i.e., how much a group writes about a
brand, seems to be the strongest indicator of extremism. It
shows that most of the times the activity involves writing a lot
about a brand compared to moderate reviewers, which can be
attributed to the fact that the group promotes/demotes a target
brand by an overwhelming number of reviews. This trend can
be explained by both the experiments: as given by random
8TABLE III: Performance of various classifiers. The task is of binary classification and thus the values of macro and micro
average are both extremely close differing only because of averaging over folds.
Classifier Micro Average Macro AveragePrecision Recall F1 ROC-AUC Precision Recall F1 ROC-AUC
SVM 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.940 0.927 0.933 0.927
Logistic Regression 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.802 0.803 0.802 0.802 0.802
Random Forest 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.782 0.784 0.782 0.783 0.782
Decision Tree 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.701 0.704 0.701 0.703 0.701
Gaussain Naive Bayes 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.576 0.737 0.576 0.647 0.576
SGD 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.829 0.866 0.829 0.847 0.829
KNN 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.816 0.818 0.816 0.817 0.816
3-Layer Perceptron 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982
4-Layer Perceptron 0.914 0.914 0.914 0.917 0.925 0.917 0.921 0.917
XGBoost 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.713 0.722 0.713 0.718 0.713
TABLE IV: Accuracy of the 3-layer Perceptron after dropping each feature in isolation.
Feature Micro Average Macro AveragePrecision Recall F1 ROC-AUC Precision Recall F1 ROC-AUC
Review count 0.640 0.640 0.640 0.641 0.647 0.641 0.644 0.641
Rating deviation 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.914 0.928 0.914 0.921 0.914
Avg. upvotes 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.956 0.957 0.956 0.956 0.956
Group time window 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.963 0.962 0.963 0.962
Verified purchase 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967
Avg. sentiment 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Early time window 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.972 0.971 0.972 0.971
Avg. rating 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973
Fig. 5: (Color online) Comparison of extremist and moderate groups based on different features used in the classification.
TABLE V: Weights given to features by Random Forest
Classifier.
Feature Weight
Review Count 0.456
Early time window 0.154
Verified purchase 0.133
Avg. rating 0.105
Avg. sentiment 0.055
Rating deviation 0.051
Avg. upvotes 0.044
Group Time window 0.001
forest, and dropping this feature causes a significant drop in
the 3-layer Perceptron’s classification accuracy.
The rating deviation of the group seems to be another
important feature for distinguishing two types of groups.
Random Forest assigns it a decent score (Table V), and 4-
Layer Perceptron also exhibits an accuracy drop on removing
this feature. This conforms to the past studies that associate
extremism in review to the rating associated with the review
[27].
Also, a major difference between extreme and moderate
reviews is whether the product being reviewed was actually
bought by the reviewer or not, as shown by the Amazon
verified purchase tag next to the review. It shows a consistent
value of importance in both our experiments.
Ratings are generally coupled with a similar sentiment in
the review text itself. Therefore, it is not a very surprising
9observation that the average sentiment of a group to a brand
also plays a minor role in the classification process, as given by
the feature weight. However, since sentiment is a bit correlated
to the rating, dropping this feature does not produce a great
loss of accuracy since the missing information is nevertheless
captured by the rating.
Unsurprisingly, average upvote count does not seem to have
much impact in the nature of the group, since, for different
product types, both kinds of reviews are helpful. Interestingly,
‘Average Rating’ does not have any significant impact on
the extremist and moderate review detection. This might be
attributed to both kinds of groups which have a similar average
over their group.
The overall trend of the extremist versus moderate reviewers
is summarized in Figure 5 and explained in the following
section.
VII. CHARACTERIZATION OF EXTREMIST GROUPS
In this section, we attempt to characterize extremist reviewer
groups and distinguish them from moderate groups. Figure
5(a) shows that on an average, the extremist group writes a
lot of 5-star reviews, while moderate users are spread around
the 4-star. This is due to the nature of the problem itself,
that extremist groups tend to give extreme ratings to the target
brand. The lack of reviews on the extreme negative side would
be discussed in later sections.
Figure 5(b) shows that extremist groups tend to give similar
ratings to the brand, giving a very small rating deviation. On
the other hand, moderate users have some variance in the
given ratings. The fact that the rating deviations is about 1 and
not higher may be attributed to the fact that generally people
naturally tend to write positive reviews, with reviews generally
not falling in the extreme negative side of the spectrum.
Figure 5(c) shows that most of the reviews written by ex-
tremist users are about verified purchases. This distribution is
significantly skewed compared to moderate users. Apparently,
this observation may seem counter-intuitive; however, this
trend can be explained by the existence of several Blackmarket
services which give products for free or heavily discounted
rates (we will discuss it later).
Figure 5(d) shows that moderate users tend to write reviews
using a neutral or near-neutral tone, with extremists writing
reviews using a positive sentiment in their writing.
Figure 5(e) indicates a similar trend of group time window
distribution for both types of groups. Therefore, this may not
be a good feature to predict the nature of a given (group,
brand) pair.
Figure 5(f) shows that extremist groups have a higher
chance of reviewing the product of target brand earlier com-
pared to the moderate users.
Figure 5(g) infers that the number of upvotes does not play
a significant role, and the trend justifies the phenomenon. This
may be attributed to the fact that either people do not take their
time to upvote meaningful reviews, and upvotes given by the
group members in case of extremist groups are nullified by
upvotes given by users to moderate reviews.
Figure 5(h) shows that extremist groups tend to write more
reviews for a target brand compared to the moderate reviewers.
VIII. DISCUSSION
During labelling and classification, we found a fair num-
ber of spam groups showing extremist behaviour. This is a
strong indicator for our hypothesis that extremism is widely
prominent at the brand level, with groups aiming to promote
or demote brands, due to various reasons which may include
economic incentives either directly or indirectly by the brand
itself.
A closer look at the target brands reveals that most of
them are not widely popular with little recognition among
the general public. This is not surprising since these brands
may be part of start-ups that might have a constraint on
resources for marketing or publicity, and thus interested in
unethical practices to boost their growth. Also, since they have
a relatively small consumer base, and thus a small number of
moderate reviews, reviews from spam groups influence their
brand image more strongly.
Well established and more reputed brands do not appear to
be a target of these malicious activities due to several reasons:
(1) they already have a huge customer base and followers, (2)
reviews by spam groups would be suppressed by the sheer
number of moderate reviews for other customers, and (3) they
have lot of reputation and popularity to lose if caught indulging
in malicious activities.
Extremity in reviews is an important indicator of attitude
of people towards a brand, and thus there is a need to
incorporate this extremism while developing systems (such
as a recommendation system or product feature summarizer)
based on product reviews. This robustness can be achieved
by discounting suspicious extreme and moderate reviews. One
way to do so would be to rank the groups by combining the
predicted extremity and collusive scores and then discount the
top-most and bottom-most reviews from the group. This would
help the model to focus on genuine extremist and genuinely
moderate reviews and not be influenced by reviews that were
incentivised with latent motives.
There exist premium services that offer plans at differ-
ent costs ranging from different reviews. Another crowd-
sourcing technique is also popular on websites like Ripple
Influence3, or Product Elf Coupons4, where a seller puts
his/her products along with a discount coupon, which the
customer (the influencer) uses to purchase the product at a
discounted price and post their reviews. Doing this, they gain
more reputation on these sites and then can “unlock” higher
discount coupons. Such kind of reviews, though effective,
will not qualify as a verified-purchase review since they were
received at discounted rates, and systems can easily prevent
spammer groups by using only verified reviews. Therefore,
spammers now require a different strategy.
Since Amazon had restricted reviews recently in 2016, the
services for obtaining reviews are forced to modify their mode
of operation. A way to circumvent the restriction imposed
on the system is to provide discount/refund off-site (e.g., a
cashback). For example, we show a dashboard for a cashback
based website (cashbackbase.com) in Figure 6. At the bottom,
3https://www.rippleinfluence.com
4http://productelf.com
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Fig. 6: Dashboard for a cashback based website.
we can see their process for issuing cashback: A reviewer
needs to “claim” the discount on the site, purchase the product
within a time limit, and upload information proving the
purchase on Amazon. After verifying the purchase, the website
sanctions a cashback into the buyer’s account. Thus the buyer
effectively was incentivised for the product purchase. Although
the website does not mandate reviews from the buyers, they
do claim that their websites can help in gathering reviews
(on the merchant portal). On further investigation, we came
to know that this is indeed the case. One such confession by
an anonymized top reviewer was seen in a blog post [62].
Thus, it is to be expected that the online marketplace will
be infested with manipulated extreme review instances. It is
even more difficult to distinguish such cases due to the off-site
nature, but by relating brand level group extremism activities
to designing robust and feasible systems becomes possible.
Finally, we find that almost all the extremist groups are
involved in promoting their target brand instead of demoting
others. This observation may be attributed to the reason that it
is more effective and profitable to edge out the competition by
boosting their own brand image, rather than working to hinder
the competition since that would require influencing a lot of
brands, requiring a lot more resources and time.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed an unexplored form of opinion
spam, where spammers target brands as a whole, posting
extreme reviews, to change the overall sentiment about the
brand. These groups are often part of a complex business
web that is capable of influencing the overall popularity and
reputation of several brands on review websites. This study
is the first step towards linking brand-level group activities
and extremism in reviews, which uncovers important insights
about marketplace activities. These insights would help in
developing a better recommendation that make use of online
reviews.
A set of candidate spam groups was retrieved using FIM,
and extremist groups were identified by observing their actions
as a group based on various features, using a supervised learn-
ing technique based on a ground-truth of manually annotated
labels. We then classified extremist and moderate groups and
compared the accuracy across multiple classification methods.
After classifying these groups, we observed behaviours for
extremist groups in detail to gain further insights about the
phenomenon and the overall trends of how these groups target
these brands. We have also released the codes and annotated
dataset for further studies.
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